Salt Lake City v. Keith Roberts : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Salt Lake City v. Keith Roberts : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
W. Andrew McCullough, LLC; Attorney for Respondent.
Roger F. Cutler; Salt Lake City Attorney; Boyd A. Ferguson; Assistant City Attorney; Richard W.
Daynes; Assistant City Prosecutor; Attorney for Petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Salt Lake City v. Roberts, No. 20000679.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/547
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
KEITH ROBERTS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000679-SC 
Priority No. 13 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari 
For Review of a Decision Issued by the Court of Appeals 
ROGER F. CUTLER (#0791) 
City Attorney 
BOYD A. FERGUSON (#4036) 
Assistant City Attorney 
RICHARD W. DAYNES (#5686) 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
451 South State, Room 505A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)535-7788 
W. ANDREW McCULLOUGH, LLC (#2170) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
(801)222-9635 HAR 19 
F I L E D 
<w" t*KSfB C 0 W T 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
KEITH ROBERTS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20000679-SC 
Priority No. 13 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari 
For Review of a Decision Issued by the Court of Appeals 
ROGER F. CUTLER (#0791) 
City Attorney 
BOYD A. FERGUSON (#4036) 
Assistant City Attorney 
RICHARD W. DAYNES (#5686) 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
451 South State, Room 505A 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801)535-7788 
W. ANDREW McCULLOUGH, LLC (#2170) 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
895 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
(801) 222-9635 
Table of Contents 
Table of Authorities ii 
Argument 1 
POINT I. Defendant-Roberts cannot make a facial challenge 
to the Ordinance 1 
POINT II. The City's Ordinance does not conflict with the 
state statute, and is not pre-empted by the 
state statute 3 
POINT III. The City's Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague 
and that argument cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal 5 
POINT IV. Defendant-Roberts's and the ACLU's right of 
privacy arguments do not apply to this case 6 
POINT V. The cases cited by Defendant-Roberts interpret 
statutory or ordinance wording unlike that in 
the City's Ordinance 9 
POINT VI. The Fourth Amendment cases defining "open 
to public view" are properly analogous to this 
case 11 
POINT VII. Defendant-Roberts acted "willfully" within 
the meaning of the City's Ordinance 15 
POINT VIII. The diagrams provided to this Court were part 
of the record before the Court of Appeals 16 
Conclusion 18 
i 
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) 5 
Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 6 
Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake, 624 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1981) 4 
Maukv. State, 529 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. App. 2000) 8, 12, 13 
Parks v. State, 526 S.E.2d 893 (Ga. App. 1999) 8 
People v. McNamara, 585 N.E.2d 788 (N.Y. 1991) 10, 11, 12, 15, 16 
Powell v. State, 510 S.E. 19 (Ga. 1998) 8 
Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (Utah 1968) 3, 4 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) 6 
State v. Broad, 600P.2d 1379 (Haw. 1979) 11 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108 2 
State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, 993 P.2d 854 1 
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1998) 14 
State v. Kalama, 8 P.3d 1224 (Haw. 2000) 11 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981) 11 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 (Utah 1993) 5, 6, 9 
State v. Rodriguez, 753 So. 2d 339 (La.App. 2000) 7, 9 
United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) 13 
United States v. Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir., 1993) 13 
Williams v. Pryor, 2001 WL 81755 (11th Cir. 2001) 1 
ii 
Rules 
UtahR.App.P.Rulell(a) 17 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Ordinances 
Salt Lake City Code Section 11.16.100 (1987) 1,15 
Salt Lake City Code Section 11.16.010(M) (1987) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 3, 4 
iii 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT-ROBERTS CANNOT MAKE A FACIAL 
CHALLENGE TO THE ORDINANCE 
Defendant-Roberts attempts to make a facial challenge to §§ 11.16.100 and 
11.16.010(M), Salt Lake City Code (collectively, the "City's ordinance"). 
However, this is not a First Amendment case, and Mr. Roberts is not a member of 
a suspect class. Mr. Roberts must show why the ordinance, as applied to him 
(rather than some other hypothetical person), is invalid. 
This Court recently said: 
A statute may be unconstitutional either on its face or as 
applied to the facts of a given case. A facial challenge is the most 
difficult because it requires the challenger to 'establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.' . . . 
An as-applied challenge, on the other hand, succeeds if the 
challenger shows that the statute was applied to him or her in an 
unconstitutional manner... .* 
This well established concept was recently explained by the U.S. 11 
Circuit Court of Appeals in a case similar in concept to the one at bar. In this 
case, Alabama had enacted a statute that made the commercial distribution of 
certain sexual devices a crime. The plaintiffs (vendors and users of the devices) 
alleged that the statute was facially unconstitutional. The 11th Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected that argument. It said that to be successful, a facial challenge 
must establish that: (a) no set of circumstances exists under which the statute 
1
 State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, 993 P.2d 854 n. 2. 
2
 Williams v. Pryor, 2001 WL 81755 (11th Cir. 2001). 
would be valid, and (b) the law could never be constitutionally applied. In its 
analysis, the court noted that a state may lawfully regulate materials harmful to 
minors. Therefore, since the statute could constitutionally be applied to minors, it 
was not unconstitutional in all its applications. Hence, the facial challenge failed. 
Similarly, in this case at bar, it is undeniable that if Mr. Roberts and a 
prostitute had engaged in explicit sexual conduct while parked in a car at noon in 
the parking lot of a busy shopping mall, their conduct would be "open to public 
view" and be unlawful. Because there is a possible constitutional application of 
the City's ordinance, Mr. Roberts's belated attempt at a facial challenge must fail. 
In this appeal, Mr. Roberts must show that, as applied to him on the night 
of his arrest, the ordinance was invalid. However, the undisputed facts before the 
trial judge show that the incident took place in a parking lot where people could 
have passed by and observed the sexual activity, regardless of Mr. Roberts's 
attempt to be secretive. Thus, the applicable law and facts of this case compel an 
affirmance of the trial court's guilty verdict. 
The Court of Appeals erred by overruling that decision by, in essence, 
substituting its findings of fact for the fact finder. The Court of Appeals should 
have reviewed the trial court's determination of fact under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. 
3
 State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108. 
2 
POINT II 
THE CITY'S ORDINANCE DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH 
THE STATE STATUTE, AND IS NOT PRE-EMPTED 
BY THE STATE STATUTE 
Mr. Roberts argues that the City cannot enact an ordinance with a broader 
definition of "public place" than is in Utah Code § 76-9-702. That statute is not 
relevant to this case. First, neither the City ordinance nor the version of Utah 
Code § 76-9-702 in effect at the time of the crime used the words "public place." 
That statute was later amended to add the words "in a public place or," before the 
existing wording "under circumstances which the person should know will likely 
cause affront or alarm." This disjunctive "or" merely broadens the applicability of 
the statute, because it makes the conduct in a public place a crime, irrespective of 
any "likelihood" standard (which applies only to the "affront or alarm" portion of 
the statute). Thus, the amendment did not reduce the City's enabling power or 
preempt the field of disorderly conduct laws as implied (without analysis) by Mr. 
Roberts. 
Mr. Roberts seeks support from Salt Lake City v. Alfred;4 however, he fails 
to properly analyze that case. In Alfred, the defendant contended that a city 
prostitution ordinance was inconsistent and in conflict with state law because the 
ordinance attempted to make crimes of acts that were not crimes under the state 
law. 
4
 437 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1968). 
a 
This Court rejected that argument and said that both the city ordinance and 
the state statute had the common purpose of defeating the business of prostitution 
or the vice of sexual intercourse for hire. Thus, the city enactments and the state 
law were closely related in subject matter. 
As a consequence, this Court said: 
[ijt is a well-established principle in this state that the city has the 
right to legislate on the same subject as a state statute where either 
the general police power or express grant of authority is conferred 
upon the municipalities. 
This Court also said: 
[t]he mere fact that an act denounced as a crime under the ordinance 
was not denounced as a crime under the statute would not 
necessarily render the act under the ordinance inconsistent with the 
statute where as here the ordinance is within the scope of the state 
law dealing with the same related subject of sexual offenses and is in 
no way repugnant to, but on the other hand is in harmony with the 
state laws.6 
Thus, it is clear that Allred does not support the preemption theory claimed by Mr. 
Roberts. 
In the case at bar, state law does not forbid the City from enacting an 
ordinance that dealt with the same subject matter as Utah Code § 76-9-702. The 
City properly denounced, as a crime, conduct that may or may not be a crime 
under the state statute. However, it clearly had the enabling power to do so and, 
under Allred and many other cases, was not preempted by the state. 
5
 Id. at 436 (emphasis added). 
6
 Id. See also, Hollingsworth v. City of South Salt Lake, 624 P.2d 1149 (Utah 
1981) (rejecting pre-emption argument in a similar case). 
A 
POINT III. 
THE CITY'S ORDINANCE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE AND THAT ARGUMENT CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Mr. Roberts also argues, as he did unsuccessfully before the Court of 
Appeals, that the City's ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. As the Court of 
Appeals held, this argument was improperly made on appeal because it was not 
raised before the trial court. This Court should reject the vagueness challenge for 
the same reason.7 
Nonetheless, the vagueness argument is not well taken. The ordinance 
would be unconstitutionally vague only if it (1) failed to provide the kind of notice 
that would enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits, or (2) 
o 
authorized arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
The ordinance is clearly not vague under that standard, as is evident from 
the secretive acts of Mr. Roberts in seeking to avoid the police, when he moved 
from the viaduct to the rear area of a public parking lot.9 
The meaning of the City's ordinance is clear on its face to ordinary people. 
This vagueness argument lacks merit and is untimely. Thus, it should be rejected 
by this Court. 
"State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993). 
8
 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). 
9
 City Brief, fact 2. 
5 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT-ROBERTS'S AND THE ACLU'S RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY ARGUMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE 
Mr. Roberts and the ACLU claim that, if the Court of Appeals had not 
imposed the "likely to be seen" gloss on the City's ordinance, the court could not 
have upheld the ordinance against a constitutional right-of-privacy challenge. 
This argument is improper because it was been raised for the first time on appeal 
before the Court of Appeals. An appellate court should not consider an issue raised 
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court's proceedings demonstrate plain 
error.10 
Mr. Roberts has not even alleged plain error by the trial court on this issue. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should not have considered that argument, nor 
should this Court. 
Furthermore, the privacy cases cited by Mr. Roberts are distinguishable 
from his case because they involved acts performed in private homes. Mr. Roberts 
cites no authority for a right of privacy in an automobile parked in a public 
parking lot or on a public street. Instead, Mr. Roberts cites Stanley v. Georgia u 
and Griswoldv. Connecticut in support of his argument. Those cases are clearly 
distinguishable because they involved conduct within a private home. Neither 
involved sex an automobile in a place accessible to passersby. 
"State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993). 
11
 394 U.S. 557(1969). 
12
 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
6 
In fact, other thoughtful decisions on more similar facts disagree with Mr. 
Roberts. For example, in State v. Rodriguez,13 the court upheld a conviction for 
indecent exposure, even though the defendant was in his automobile with the 
doors closed. The defendant in that case argued that he was not in a place "open 
to public view" while in his car. The court disagreed, and said: "a citizen has a 
diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile as opposed to a dwelling." 
Notably, Rodriguez did not involve a Fourth Amendment search issue. (See Point 
V below.) 
Mr. Roberts claims that there would "literally" be no place that he could go 
for his sexual acts which the police would not claim was open to public view. 
That generalization is obviously wrong. Mr. Roberts could have gone to a motel 
or a private home. The very purpose of the City's ordinance is to require people 
who choose to have sexual relations to do so in private places, rather than in 
automobiles or other places "open to public view," where passersby can be 
exposed to their conduct. 
The ACLU stresses the right of privacy angle. It seems to argue that the 
City ordinance is unconstitutional, unless interpreted to mean "likely to be seen." 
It cites cases that purportedly recognize a "seclusion privilege." However, all of 
those cases involved statutory interpretation, rather than constitutional analysis. 
Further, none of the cases ruled that it would be unconstitutional for a city to enact 
13
 753 So.2d 339 (La. App. 2000). 
14
 Id. at 345 (emphasis added). 
7 
a law as drafted by Salt Lake City or with a meaning urged by the City for its 
ordinance. 
The ACLU also argues that a justifiable expectation of privacy can exist in 
places capable of use or observance by the public. It cites no cases on this point, 
but simply says, ipsi dixit, that if its assertion were not the law, sexual relations in 
a private bedroom could be covered by the ordinance because police could peer 
through a gap in window curtains. That self-serving declaration is absurd. Such 
conduct would constitute a trespass and be an illegal search. In any event, such a 
defense is a facial challenge that Mr. Roberts (and therefore the ACLU) cannot 
make.15 Even if the ACLU's hypothetical were accepted, it would not help Mr. 
Roberts's position because his case is not anything like the proposed hypothetical. 
He was not in a private bedroom in a private residence.16 
Finally, the ACLU notes that the City's ordinance includes the phrase 
"where an expectation of privacy . . . is not reasonably justified," and argues that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is justified when sexual activities take place in 
15
 See Point I, supra, 
16
 Roberts relies on Powell v. State, 510 S.E. 18 (Ga. 1998) for a right to privacy 
for private and consensual sodomy. That case is distinguishable. First, it involved 
conduct within a private home, not in an automobile. Second, the court expressly 
held that the right of privacy did not apply to sexual acts performed, either in a 
public place or in exchange for money. 510 S.E.2d at 23-24. See also, Parks v. 
State, 526 S.E.2d 893, 895 (Ga. App. 1999) (distinguishing Powell on those 
grounds, and upholding a conviction for sodomy in an automobile parked in the 
defendant's driveway); Maukv. State, 529 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. App. 2000) 
(distinguishing Powell because Powell involved conduct within a private home). 
The Powell court noted that "the State has a role in shielding the public from 
inadvertent exposure to the intimacies of others . . . " 510 S.E.2d at 24 (emphasis 
added). 
8 
an area where they are not likely to be seen by members of the general public. 
This Court should reject this ACLU argument because it is being raised for the 
first time on appeal.17 Furthermore, as noted above, the ACLU's cited cases on 
privacy involve activities occurring in private homes. In contrast, the Fourth 
1 0 
Amendment cases cited by the City and State v. Rodriguez, establish that a 
person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile parked in 
a publicly-accessible place. Sex acts in an automobile parked in a public parking 
lot do not meet that definition, as was had by the trial court. The ACLU failed to 
cite one relevant case to support reversing that plain meaning interpretation, on the 
facts of this case. Thus, the trial judge's ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
THE CASES CITED BY DEFENDANT-ROBERTS 
INTERPRET STATUTORY OR ORDINANCE 
WORDING UNLIKE THAT IN THE CITY'S 
ORDINANCE 
The fundamental issue in this case is whether the City can adopt a valid 
ordinance that criminalizes sexual conduct that is done in a place to which the 
public has access or in which there is the possibility (even if not the likelihood) 
that the conduct will be observed by members of the public, if the persons 
engaging in the conduct have no reasonable expectation of privacy. Unless such 
an ordinance is unconstitutional for some reason, it is beside the point that other 
states or cities may have adopted laws containing different wording. Thus, if a 
17
 State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993). 
18
 753 So.2d 339 (La. App. 2000) 
o 
city makes a policy choice to only prohibit sex acts are "likely to be seen" or to be 
done in a "public place," that decision is not legal precedent against a more 
restrictive law. 
Salt Lake City declined to use such words, and this Court should not hold 
that the City's ordinance must be twisted to mean what the Hawaii or New York 
legislatures chose their laws to mean. 
Mr. Roberts claims that the Court of Appeals acted properly when it 
interpreted "open to public view" in the City's ordinance to mean "likely to be 
seen." In this argument, Mr. Roberts cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions 
to justify that interpretation; however, each case is clearly distinguishable. This 
conclusion is highlighted by the fact that Mr. Roberts has made no attempt to 
refute the City's distinguishing of those cases in its opening brief.19 Mr. Roberts 
For example, Mr. Roberts relies heavily on People v. McNamara, 585 N.E.2d 
788 (N.Y. 1991). However, in that case the defendant was charged under a public 
lewdness statute (article 245) that required that the conduct be done in a "public 
place," a phrase that the statute left undefined. Therefore, New York the court 
applied its own meaning to the words. In contrast, the City's ordinance does not 
use the words "public place," but instead uses the defined term "open to public 
view." Further, the City defined that term and this definition did not adopt the 
more liberal position of some jurisdictions. There is absolutely no reason for this 
Court to accept Mr. Roberts's invitation to ignore the City ordinance definition and 
import the New York court's judicial gloss on a differently-worded New York 
statute. 
Furthermore, in McNamara the court noted that a different section of the 
state code (article 240) defined "public place" broadly to be any place to which the 
public has access. The court declined to use that definition because it was limited 
by its terms to that separate article of the code. It said that the legislature chose 
not to make that same broad definition applicable to article 245, so neither would 
the court. Significantly, the New York court found no constitutional flaw with the 
definition in article 240. It simply held that the definition did not apply to the 
10 
essentially says that because courts in other states have interpreted wording "X" to 
mandate a "likely to be seen" test, then that same test must apply to wording "Y" 
that the City used in its ordinance. That argument does not follow logically nor is 
it supported by the case law. 
POINT VI 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES DEFINING 
"OPEN TO PUBLIC VIEW" ARE 
PROPERLY ANALOGOUS TO THIS CASE 
The Fourth Amendment cases cite by the City are relevant because they 
actually define "open to public view." In State v. Lee,20 this Court said that a place 
is open to public view if it is within "plain view" "from a position where [the 
officer] is entitled to be" (Emphasis added.) Those are the key elements, not Mr. 
Roberts's discussion about police "creating" the crime by observing it. 
conduct at issue. Therefore, Mr. Roberts's argument that all lewdness or indecent 
exposure laws, regardless of their actual wording, must be interpreted as the 
McNamara court interpreted the words "public place," is misguided. 
Similarly, Mr. Roberts cites State v. Broad, 600 P.2d 1379 (Haw. 1979). 
However, in that case the statute used the term "public place" and expressly 
defined it as a place "likely to be observed by others." The City's ordinance does 
not contain that language, and Broad is irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
words "open to public view" must, necessarily, mean "likely to be seen." Broad 
begs that question. 
Mr. Robert's citation of State v. Kalama, 8 P.3d 1224 (Haw. 2000) is also 
misguided. In that case, the statute did not refer to "place open to public view" or 
even to "public place." It defined indecent exposure to be the exposure of genitals 
"under circumstances in which the actor's conduct is likely to cause affront." The 
court merely decided whether the defendant intended to cause an affront to fellow 
nude sunbathers. Therefore, Kalama provides no guidance on the issues in this 
case. 
20633P.2d48 (Utah 1981). 
11 
Also, many of the absurd hypothetical posed by Mr. Roberts and the 
ACLU involve officers being in places where they are not entitled to be, such as 
peering over a windowsill into a private bedroom. That activity would be 
trespassing and violation of the Fourth Amendment case law. Equally important, 
those factual circumstances are not involved in this case. 
Mr. Roberts asserts that whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
is determined by using an objective test: However, Mr. Roberts relies on cases 
from other states interpreting distinct and different statutory wording. For 
example, Mr. Roberts cites People v. McNamara21 for the proposition that the 
Fourth Amendment case law about "open view" or "plain view" is not analogous 
to the definition of "open to public view" in the City's ordinance. That summary 
is a gross overstatement. 
The McNamara court merely held that the diminished expectation of 
privacy in automobiles, established by the Fourth Amendment cases, did not 
transform the interior of an automobile into a "public place." However, the City's 
ordinance does not refer to "public place" and the Fourth Amendment cases are 
very useful in determining whether a place is "open to the public view," because 
that is the very basis of the analysis in the Fourth Amendment cases. 
In fact, some courts have explicitly applied the Fourth Amendment privacy 
99 
standards in indecent exposure cases. For example, in Mauk v. State, the court 
21585 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1991). 
22
 529 S.E.2d 197 (Ga. App. 2000) 
12 
upheld the conviction of a man for sexual conduct in a wooded area adjacent to a 
public road, where the conduct could easily be seen from the road. Quoting 
another case, the court said: 
[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities 
conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately 
surrounding the home. This rule is true to the conception of the right 
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment... An open field 
need be neither open nor a field as those terms are used in common 
speech. For example, a thickly wooded area nonetheless may be an 
open field as that term is used in construing the Fourth 
Amendment.23 
The ACLU attempts to support Mr. Roberts's argument with a bizarre and 
inapposite right-of-privacy hypothetical about helicopters flying over backyards. 
The ACLU's analysis is flawed because its hypothetical is not a "plain view" case. 
Rather, it is a case where probable cause exists for a lawful search. Absent 
probable cause to search under the ACLU's hypothetical, the police could not fly a 
helicopter over the resident's home to find marijuana or otherwise because the 
home owner does have a reasonable expectation of privacy.24 However, as 
demonstrated above, that factual situation would have no relevance to an "open to 
view" case involving an automobile, rather than a home. 
Additionally, Mr. Roberts and the ACLU stress the expectation of privacy 
element. In doing so, they attempt to distinguish the Fourth Amendment search 
cases from the Mr. Roberts' facts on that basis. However, they fail to mention that 
2 3/d.atl98. 
24
 United States v. Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510, 1513-14 (10th Cir, 1993) see also, 
United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996). 
the Fourth Amendment cases cited by them consider expectations of privacy in 
their analysis. For example, in State v. Holden,25 the Utah Court of Appeals used 
the language "expectation of privacy" in its analysis of a search and seizure case. 
The court looked at whether it is reasonably justifiable to have an "expectation of 
privacy" in one's front yard when such an area is "open to the public view." The 
court said: 
[t]he trial court therefore did not clearly err when it found that 
Holden had no subjective expectation of privacy in the activities in 
his front yard visible from his neighbor's window. 
There was no reasonable expectation of privacy because the 
surveillance was of the front yard and of areas "open to the public 
view."27 
That definition and the one used in the City's ordinance are identical. 
In sum, Mr. Roberts's and the ACLU's positions are inconsistent with Utah 
case law, inconsistent with the City's definition of its own ordinance, and would 
be (at best) difficult for police officers to apply in the field. Under their analysis, a 
person could stand naked on the steps of the State Capitol at midnight and might 
not be prosecutable because it would be "unlikely" that the public would see this 
individual parading naked at that time of night. On the other hand, a police officer 
would surely conclude that such conduct was "open to public view" as defined in 
the City's ordinance and by state case law. 
25
 964 P.2d 318 (Utah App. 1998) 
26/d.at322. 
27
 Id. 
14 
A person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy on the steps of 
the Capitol. That conclusion does not change because the instant case involves 
disorderly conduct, rather than a Fourth Amendment search. Thus, the strained 
distinctions and analysis of Mr. Roberts and the ACLU should be rejected. 
POINT VII 
DEFENDANT-ROBERTS ACTED "WILLFULLY" WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE CITY'S ORDINANCE 
Mr. Roberts contends that his conduct in exposing his genitals was not 
willful or intentional; thus, he asserts he cannot be found guilty under the City's 
ordinance. He asserts he did not violate the ordinance because he did not make a 
willful or intentional effort "to be seen." Mr. Roberts misreads § 11.16.100 of the 
City Code. That section only requires that the sexual conduct be done willfully. It 
does not require that the person "willfully" be in a place open to public view. 
It is unquestioned that no one forced Mr. Roberts to unzip his pants and 
expose himself. Further, there is no claim that the sex acts or the exposure was 
inadvertent. Thus, he clearly did those acts willfully and intentionally. That 
intentional result is all that § 11.16.100 requires. 
This statutory construction is even supported by the case on which Mr. 
Roberts heavily relies, People v. McNamara. Here, the lewdness statute 
allowed conviction when an exposure of the private parts of the body was made 
either (1) in a "public place"; or (2) in private premise, under circumstances in 
28585N.E.2d793(N.Y. 1991). 
1 * 
which the person may readily be observed, if done with the intent that he be so 
observed. The defendant in that case was charged with lewdness under the first 
prong, and the court held that the intent to be observed was not an element of the 
crime of exposure in a "public place," unlike under the second prong.29 Similarly 
in the case at bar, the City ordinance does not (by its terms) require any intent to 
be seen. 
Obviously, the result urged by Mr. Roberts was not intended by the City 
Council, under the plain meaning rules of statutory construction. Further, there is 
no legal requirement for such a scienter requirement regarding the location of the 
sexual activity. Therefore, this Court should not judicially rewrite the ordinance to 
impose such a requirement. 
POINT VIII 
THE DIAGRAMS PROVIDED TO THIS COURT 
WERE PART OF THE RECORD BEFORE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Mr. Roberts argues that the diagrams (representing the area where he was 
arrested) were not part of the appellate record. In this representation, Mr. Roberts 
has disingenuously alleged that it is "unfortunate that this Court will have to rely 
on 'word pictures', presented by the prosecution witnesses, without the diagrams 
made at trial and shown to the trial court."30 
29
 "We therefore conclude that the actor's intent is irrelevant to determining what is 
a 'public place' under Penal Law § 245.00(a)." Id at 792. 
30
 Brief of Appellant to the Court of Appeals, p. 9. 
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That assertion is not true. The undisputed facts show that the Court of 
Appeals did not have to rely on such "word pictures." At trial, Judge Barrett made 
special effort to have those diagrams recorded onto the video transcript, so they 
could be available for review on appeal. This video transcript was provided to the 
Court of Appeals on appeal and has been available for the parties and the Court to 
review throughout the entire appeal process. 
The Court of Appeals may not have watched the videotape. In fact, it may 
have been misled by Mr. Roberts's oral declarations concerning the nature of the 
parking lot in which he was arrested. However, it cannot be honestly claimed that 
this video was not before the Court of Appeals. To prevent this error from being 
repeated and in order the help this Court avoid such confusion, the City obtained 
the videotape from the Court record. It printed a hard copy of parts of that record 
and included them for this Court's review. 
Considering the confusion below, the identification of this critical portion 
of the trial record is necessary and proper under the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Rule 11(a) states, "[t]he transcript of proceedings... shall constitute 
the record on appeal in all cases." (Emphasis added). 
The video transcript, therefore, is and was part of the record on this appeal. 
It graphically demonstrates that Mr. Roberts's recitation of the geography where 
the sex acts occurred is not accurate. It also clearly shows that the incident took 
place in a location "open to public view," within the meaning of a valid City 
ordinance. That evidence, properly received and used by the trial judge, should 
also be employed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial judge was proper. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals remanding the case to the trial judge was in error and should be reversed, 
with instruction to reinstate the trial judge's guilty verdict. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/£_ day of March, 2001. 
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